02/19/2020

Meeting Minutes for:
Strategic Planning Committee Meeting Part 1
Yuma International Airport, Conference Room
Wednesday, February 19, 2020 at 04:02 PM

    Call to Order:
    The Yuma County Airport Authority, Inc. (YCAA) Strategic Planning Committee Meeting of the Board of Directors was called to order at 4:02PM on February 19, 2020 in the Yuma International Airport Conference Room, 2191 E. 32nd Street, Suite 218, Yuma, Arizona 85365. The Presiding officer was Russell Jones, Chairman.

    COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT WERE:
    Russel Jones, Chairman & YCAA Secretary
    Dean Hager, 1st Vice President
    Albert Gardner, Director
    Jenny Torres, City of San Luis

    COMMITTEE MEMBERS ABSENT WERE:
    None

    ALSO PRESENT WERE:
    Bill Craft, YCAA President (exited the meeting at 5:35PM)
    Gladys Brown, Airport Director
    Gerald Hinkle, Jr., Chief Financial Officer
    Mark Workman, Director of Operations
    Juan Trasvina, Operations Supervisor
    Gen Grosse, Property/Community Relations
    Lt. Colonel Henry Hortenstine, USMC, Military Liaison
    Greg McShane, MCAS Operations Officer
    Ken Scott, ASN Volunteer
    Guy Gale, General Aviation
    James Kent, General Aviation
    Pam Kent, General Aviation
    Dale Johnson, General Aviation
    Cody Naquin, General Aviation
    David Simkins, AeroCare/Guardian Flight
    Michael Swift, Gowan Company, LLC
    Bob Kaye, Civil Air Patrol Squadron 508
    Allen Orendorff, General Aviation
    Mick Moynilian, EAA
    Rob Olmstead, Careflight
    Robert Helfrich, General Aviation
    David Nickerson, General Aviation
    Austin Claborn, General Aviation

    CALL TO THE PUBLIC
    Call to the Public was moved to the end of the meeting.

    REGULAR AGENDA

    1) Discussion of MCAS Yuma’s request to amend the Joint Use Operating Agreement to mandate participation in MCAS Yuma’s Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS) for all personnel desiring to access the airfield.

    The Mr. Jones, provided a brief introduction of the meeting agenda topic, and an overview of how the meeting would be structured, to ensure participation of interested parties in attendance followed by a presentation by Ms. Brown.

    During the presentation, Ms. Brown described how an airfield incident in 2019 initiated an overall review of airfield access issues by MCAS Yuma, including existing requirements on the YCAA side of the airport. She described how this process resulted in MCAS Yuma’s request for an amendment to the Joint Use Operating Agreement (JUOA) Letter of Agreement #6 regarding security which in part reads that the “YCAA will use MCAS security policies and procedures to the maximum extent possible.”

    Ms. Brown described how the current effort to the JUOA has other elements to it, this meeting is intended to address MCAS Yuma’s request for YCAA to mandate that all persons seeking YCAA’s authorization to access to the Airfield Operating Area (AOA), (Inside the Fenceline), participate in a vetting process utilized by MCAS Yuma. She specified to the Committee that this procedure, if agreed to, would be in addition to the requirements YCAA currently imposes on its airfield users since these measures are required by the TSA.

    Ms. Brown explained how the measure, if agreed to would affect over 800 airfield users. She explained further how the existing vetting process, mandated by the TSA is stipulated as being required in the Airports Minimum Standards, Section 2 “Rules and Regulations”. The Airports Minimum Standards are adopted by the Airports Board of Directors. Ms. Brown described the existing vetting process which contains two different elements depending upon the type of access requested. One process for general airfield access and another for the more restricted “boxed in” area called the SIDA where Commercial Aircraft operate. She described the two different processes which were detailed on a slide as follows:

    - General access to the AOA. This is the process that the vast majority of our users undergo, approximately 600 people. This level of vetting involves the submission of identity documents and information and providing an image. The data is provided to the TSA for a Security Threat Analysis (STA). The TSA determines the outcome of this process and notifies Operations staff accordingly.

    - Access to the SIDA. The Security Identification Area or SIDA is a specifically identified and includes areas such as the Sterile Area and ramp space surrounding Commercial Airliners. The number of persons who have access to the SIDA is approximately 200. The vetting process involved in providing access to the SIDA is also dictated by TSA regulations and includes an FBI for a Criminal Records History Check (CHRC) along with the performance of the STA described above. The application for a CHRC includes a list of offences which if uncovered during the process may prevent access being authorized.

    Ms. Brown described how the vetting process is accomplished including how it is taken care of “in house” and efforts are taken to make the application process as customer friendly as possible. Ms. Brown also told the Committee that the results of the vetting process is not public information and cannot be shared by law. Ms. Brown then introduced Mark Workman, who provided a presentation on the additional vetting process requested by MCAS Yuma called the Defense Biometric Identification system or DBIDS.

    Mr. Workman explained in some detail the history of the DBIDS vetting system and how it is used almost universally by the Department of Defense throughout the United States including having vetted millions of persons, over 55,000 of which had information uncovered deemed “adverse”. Mr. Workman described how access authorization resulting from the DBIDS process used at MCAS Yuma does not provide access authorization to any other defense installation. In that sense, the system and its results are localized.

    Mr. Workman went into some detail as to the process involved in being vetted by the DBIDS system. The process was detailed in several slides which included four steps:
    1. Access the DBIDS system on-line and “pre-enroll”
    2. Filling out a one page form which describes your access request and identifies your “sponsor”
    3. Calling for an appointment with the “Pass and Registration” office at MCAS Yuma
    4. Attending the appointment bring with you the following documents:
    a. Printed evidence of your DBIDS system on-line pre-enrollment. (QR Code)
    b. Driver’s license
    c. Original Social Security Card
    d. Additional immigration documents for Naturalized US Citizens and Non-US Citizens

    After the completion of Mr. Workman’s brief on the DBIDS system, Mr. Jones asked about the amount of time involved in the appointment process. Mr. Workman described the amount of time experienced by a limited number of his staff who have gone through the process as anywhere from 45 minutes to 2 hours. Ms. Torres asked what the duration of the process is. Mr. Workman shared between 30 minutes to 2 hours, there is no cost to do it and it needs to be done every two years. Ms. Torres asked what is the difference between the TSA screening and what MCAS Yuma is proposing. Mr. Workman did not know for sure. Mr. Jones asked if the TSA Security Threat Assessment could be shared with MCAS Yuma. Ms. Brown said it is unknown.

    After calling for any further questions of Mr. Workman, Mr. Jones asked the Airport Director, Ms. Brown to continue with the remainder of the presentation.

    Ms. Brown continued with her presentation describing MCAS Yuma’s request for the YCAA to add their DBIDS vetting process to our existing mandated airfield access authorization process. She described MCAS Yuma’s desire to participate in the process through their DBIDS system for informational purposes only. Ms. Brown indicated that MCAS Yuma is not requesting the ability to have a say in the ultimate determination of who has access to our side of the airfield.

    Since the YCAA has unrestricted access to the airfield, Ms. Brown has agreed to have YCAA employees undergo the DBIDS process and a small number of employees have already done so. She described that the issue at hand is whether or not the Board of Directors intends to agree to MCAS Yuma’s request that the YCAA mandate the completion of the DBIDS process to the other 788 users of the airfield.
    Ms. Brown explained that in order to do so, the YCAA would have to modify the Rules and Regulations contained within the Minimum Standards to mandate the process based upon our agreement to do so through the Joint Use Operating Agreement.

    Ms. Brown described to the Committee the YCAA’s experience with adding additional vetting requirements in the past as having been unpopular. She also indicated that adding procedures that are not required by regulation, but instead, in accordance with a voluntary agreement to do so would generate resistance by airfield users.

    Ms. Brown expressed her concerns about the process itself being outside of YCAA’s control, especially the requirement to make an appointment at MCAS Yuma which takes the customer experience out of YCAA’s control.

    Another consideration Ms. Brown described is the possibility of having to defend mandating the additional procedures if an airfield user challenges our authority to do so. Additionally, She explained how participation in the DBIDS process could ultimately result in a situation in which MCAS Yuma obtains adverse results and asks YCAA to consider the results in the Airport’s decision whether or not to authorize airfield access when existing procedures mandated by the TSA does not indicate a problem.

    At the conclusion of Ms. Brown’s presentation, she explained that the Committee is being requested to examine if mandating this additional process prior to authorizing airfield access to our users is something the YCAA will consider as part of the Joint Use Operating Agreement amendment process.

    Mr. Gardner, a member of the EAA spoke on behalf of the General Aviation community and said they already comply with many regulations and the additional level of scrutiny is unnecessary and useless. Members of the General Aviation community are the first line of defense and take care of ensuring security of the airfield and report security issues to Operations. The incident was not caused by local pilots but by other airfield users and cited contractors associated with MCAS projects are not even complying with the rules home based users are forced to adhere to. GA have already complied with mandates for driving to access their hangars. While many of the GA community are veterans and support MCAS, they are not in favor of the additional level of screening.

    At 4:53 Mr. Jones read Mr. Joe Fisher and Mr. Larry Gabele’s letters of opposition:

    Mr. Joe Fisher (GA Tenant):

    Unfortunately, Annie and I will be out of town on Wednesday and unable to attend the meeting. I feel that the current vetting process is more than adequate. We have all been finger printed and had federal background checks. I have landed at hundreds of airports across this great land and this is the only one that requires me to be fingerprinted for access.
    While I appreciate the military’s need for security, I do not feel that another layer of federal screening will improve security and only serve to further inconvenience the law-abiding users and supporters of the airport. Please do not make the process any more onerous than it already is.
    Sincerely,
    Joe Fisher

    Mr. Larry Gabele (GA Tenant):

    To the Yuma County Airport Authority:
    My name is Larry Gabele and for the past three years I have been renting hero hangar number five at the Yuma County Airport. Prior to renting the hangar I was landing at the Yuma Airport and tying down my plane at the Martha Stewart and Millionaire FBO for over 10 years. I am 72 years old, a Navy Veteran and have been a pilot for 51 years.

    Last Friday I was notified of a meeting to be held by the Yuma County Airport Authority on Wednesday, February 19th, to discuss additional security measures being requested by MCAS Yuma. When I made my original request to rent a hangar from the Yuma Airport Authority I was required to go through a thorough background check required by TSA to determine my eligibility to be able to access this hangar by car. I was also required to study the rules and regulations prescribed by YCAA and pass a written test of these regulations in order to be allowed to drive my automobile to my rental hangar. My access is limited to an area approximately 400 feet long in front of my hangar row. I cannot drive to other hangars on the field to visit other pilots nor can I drive my car to the FBo at Millionaire to be able to communicate with the FBO to discuss Aircraft maintenance or operations without having to exit my area of the field, drive around the airport and travel a mile and a half around the airport to access the building which is only 300 feet from my hangar.

    Now I am being told that MCAS Yuma wants to impose another layer of regulations and background checks over and above the threat assessment evaluation performed by TSA. Being a veteran I clearly appreciated the role of our US military and I understand the importance of security for our military operations. It is my opinion that this additional level of regulations is unnecessary, overreaching and appears to be an attempt by MCAS Yuma to further discourage private aircraft operations at the Yuma Airport. I ask that the YCAA deny the request from MCAS Yuma to impose these new and additional security check regulations.

    Thank you,

    Larry Gabele

    At 4:55, Ms. Torres asked if the YCAA BOD determines to comply with the request how will the YCAA work with MCAS to complete the process. Ms. Brown explained MCAS would like all airfield users to complete the process as soon as possible. Therefore the YCAA would send notifications to airfield tenants/users addressing the requirement, provide detailed instructions to complete the process and provide a deadline for users to complete the process.

    Mr. Jones asked what happens when expected milestones are not reached, what if the hangar tenant decides they will not comply. Ms. Brown explained the YCAA BOD would need to incorporate the change into the Joint Use Operating Agreement, and the Minimum Standards. If the hangar tenant do not comply with the DBIDs they will have to be escorted by Airport Operations to their facility. Ms. Brown explained the ability for users to file a complaint for discrimination for being denied airfield access, and it could possibly affect future grant opportunities if YCAA undergoes an investigation. Mr. Craft calculated it would take one person from MCAS Pass and Registration approximately 40 weeks to process applications for the 800 airfield users. Lt. Col. Hortenstine said users can expect it to take 30 minutes.

    Mr. Hager asked if YCAA has received feedback from tenants. Ms. Brown confirmed YCAA and TSA will comply but doesn’t know how it will affect other airfield tenants such as Federal Express, American or DCC/Joe Foss Hangar tenants. She continued the General Aviation users are the airport’s first line of security. The YCAA could consider pilot actuated gating systems but that option is not grant eligible. Mr. Jones asked Bob Kaye of the Civil Air Patrol how many members are badged to which Mr. Kaye responded eight leaders are badged.

    Mr. Gardner asked if the requirement would have a negative impact on the EAA’s Young Eagles outreach events designed to encourage youth involvement in aviation. Ms. Brown responded those are considered special events and persons on the airfield need to be escorted. Special events are encouraged and should be identified with ample notice to coordinate additional persons with escort privileges.

    Mr. Jones asked what is MCAS Yuma’s specific requirement or purpose, is it to have knowledge of who has access or who has applied to be on the airfield, but not of who that applicant is bringing on the airfield? The YCAA has already implemented many levels of security processes including mil-spec fencing, security cameras and YCAA Airport Operations already can see who is on the airfield in real time. Mr. Jones said the screening performed by YCAA Operations is checked against the No-Fly and four other lists and he does not see the added value of the additional screening and feels it is redundant.

    Mr. Craft asked what agency is enforcing the request and what does the applicant get in return. Mr. McShane said the applicant will get documentation of having completed the application process but will not get additional badge or MCAS Yuma Base access. Lt. Col. Hortenstine said the DBIDs system doesn’t let MCAS know when a person is accessing the airfield and right now MCAS does not have oversight of anyone who has already been vetted by YCAA Operations Security Threat Analysis. He continued recent incidents brought this to Headquarters Marine Corps’ (HQMC)attention because of the substantial security risk/potential breach in security protecting the F-35 based at MCAS Yuma. HQMC wants mitigation and MCAS Yuma believes DBIDs is the solution. The Security Threat Assessment conducted as a requirement by TSA vets users by detecting those who may be a threat to aviation safety but does not vet/detect threats to national security, espionage or those who may easily be blackmailed. MCAS Yuma is a federal facility and is already a magnet for these types of individuals. The DBIDs solution provides the Commanding Officer oversight of those applying for airfield access.


    CONTINUED ON STRATEGIC PLANNING COMMITTEE MEETING PART 2



    // Approved //
    Russell Jones
    Secretary Yuma County Airport Authority; Strategic Planning Committee Chairman
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